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A B S T R A C T   
Flexibility markets are a promising tool to make better use of existing distribution grids. We analyse four pio-
neering projects implementing flexibility markets: Piclo Flex, Enera, GOPACS, and NODES. Based on a literature 
review, we develop a six-question framework. We find that all of the considered flexibility markets are operated 
by a third party. All projects also engage with multiple DSOs to become the standardized platform provider. 
Differences among the projects are found in the extent to which the flexibility markets are integrated into other 
existing markets, the use of reservation payments, the use of standardized products, and the way TSO-DSO 
cooperation is done. The answers to these questions vary for the projects because of different visions, use 
cases, or project maturity. Our case study analysis of four pioneering projects enriches the taxonomy and shows 
that practice is moving faster than the conceptual debate around flexibility markets.   
1. Introduction 
It is clear that solely relying on grid investments to cope with 
increasing electricity load and the connection of decentralised genera-
tion to the distribution grid will be very expensive. In Europe, flexibility 
markets are recognised as a tool to make better use of the existing dis-
tribution grids and thereby also reduce the need for grid investments. 
Namely, the newly adopted Clean Energy Package for all Europeans 
states that distribution system operators shall procure services in a 
market-based manner from resources such as distributed generation, 
demand response, or storage when such services are cheaper than grid 
expansion.1 Similarly, the Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER) and the respondents to its recent consultation identify market- 
based procurement as the preferred approach to foster the use of flexi-
bility at the distribution grid (CEER, 2018). Finally, the European 
Network for Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) 
and the major associations for European Distribution System Operators 
(DSOs) recently published a report in which they emphasize the need for 
grid flexibility procurement (ENTSO-E et al., 2019). This report also laid 
out how transmission system operators (TSOs) can coordinate with 
DSOs as flexibility connected to the distribution grid can be used by both 
network operators to relieve congestion or for other services. 
Most of the existing literature on flexibility markets focuses on their 
conceptualization. We go a step further by confronting these concepts 
with the actual projects that are emerging. First, we conduct a literature 
review to identify the main controversies around the design of flexibility 
markets, which we summarize as six yes or no questions. We illustrate 
that the same controversies came up in the debate around the design of 
other electricity markets, from wholesale to balancing and redispatching 
markets. Second, we analyse the four pioneering flexibility market 
projects with our six-question framework. 
The four selected projects are Piclo Flex, Enera, GOPACS, and 
NODES, chosen because they are, as far as the authors are aware, the 
most advanced initiatives in terms of implementation.2 Piclo Flex and 
GOPACS are since recently fully operational after a piloting phase. 
NODES is a start-up that currently implements pilots and intends to 
* Corresponding author. Florence School of Regulation, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Via Boccaccio 121, I-50133, 
Italy. 
E-mail addresses: tim.schittekatte@eui.eu, leonardo.meeus@vlerick.com (T. Schittekatte).   
1 See Art. 32 ‘Incentives for the use of flexibility in distribution networks’ in the Directive for the internal market in electricity (recast) (European Commission, 
2019).  
2 SmartEN (2019), the European business association for digital and decentralised energy solutions, shortly introduces five projects in its position paper on the 
design principles for local electricity markets for system services. These include the four projects covered in this study. The fifth project introduced by SmartEN 
(2019) is IREMEL. IREMEL was set up by OMIE, the Spanish power exchange, and by IDEA, the Spanish Institute for the Diversification and Saving of Energy. As far 
as the authors are aware, IREMEL is rather in the design phase at the time of writing. USEF (2018), the Universal Smart Energy Framework, covers GOPACS, NODES, 
and Enera in their white paper on flexibility markets. 
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become commercially operational in the near future. Enera is part of the 
development program Smart Energy Showcases – Digital Agenda for the 
Energy Transition (SINTEG) by the German Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs and Energy, and profits from a regulatory sandbox.3 Enera 
is an ambitious pilot with the goal to develop scalable solutions. There 
are also other research projects related to flexibility marketplaces with 
smaller scale R&D demonstrators, examples of such projects are 
OSMOSE, SmartNet, and WindNode. An overview is given in ENTSO-E 
(2018a). 
Note finally that flexibility markets refer to peer-to-peer trading or 
local markets, as well as, to markets that are used by DSOs, and possibly 
also TSOs, to redispatch their grids. The projects referred to in this study 
also illustrate how the different types of trading activities can take place 
on the same platform. The need for redispatching comes from the fact 
that distribution constraints are not adequately taken into account in the 
existing wholesale and balancing markets. To the extent that this can be 
solved, there will be less need for flexibility markets, but that is a dis-
cussion beyond our scope. A discussion of so-called nodal pricing for 
distribution grids can be found in the MIT Utility of the Future report 
(MIT Energy Initiative, 2016) and a discussion of how zonal pricing 
could be implemented at distribution level can be found in Hadush and 
Meeus (2018). 
The article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our six- 
question framework. In Section 3, we analyse the four pioneering pro-
jects using the six-question framework. The six questions are: (1) Is the 
flexibility market integrated into the existing sequence of EU electricity 
markets? (2) Is the flexibility market operator a third party? (3) Are there 
reservation payments? (4) Are the products standardized? (5) Is there TSO- 
DSO cooperation for the organisation of the flexibility market? And (6) Is 
there DSO-DSO cooperation for the organisation of the flexibility market? 
For each question, we provide an answer and a discussion. In Section 4, 
we briefly discuss design choices that need to be made regarding market 
access, settlement, and responsibilities. These choices go beyond flexi-
bility market design; they have to do with the participation of distrib-
uted energy resources, individually or through aggregation, to 
electricity markets in general. Finally, a conclusion is provided. 
2. Six controversies around flexibility market design 
In this section, we introduce six controversies around the design of 
flexibility markets based on a survey of existing academic literature and 
stakeholder reports recently published on the topic. Table 1 maps the 
documentation for each of the six controversies. There is not necessarily 
a debate with academia on the one side and practice on the other side, 
and all of the questions can be controversial from both perspectives. 
These are so-called regulatory “grey areas”. In the following section, we 
briefly discuss each controversy and illustrate how it also came up in 
debates about the design of other electricity markets.4 
First, the resources connected at the distribution level have multiple 
uses in terms of flexibility. Their flexibility can serve for congestion 
management, for system balancing, and for portfolio balancing by Bal-
ance Responsible Parties (BRPs). Different market design options are 
possible. ENTSO-E et al. (2019), Gerard et al. (2018), Ramos et al. 
(2016), USEF (2018) and Villar et al. (2018) all discuss the option to 
create a separate flexibility platforms for congestion management, with 
the network operators (the DSO and possibly the TSO) as single buyers, 
or to have a so-called integrated market model, with DSOs contracting 
flexibility for congestion management through the existing markets 
(day-ahead, intraday and/or balancing). Vicente Pastor et al. (2018) 
conduct a game-theoretical analysis of the different options. Their 
analysis suggests that the most effective co-ordination would be regu-
lated cooperative dispatch between all network and system operators, 
and a separate competitive market for BRPs. This dilemma is not entirely 
new. For example, the balancing energy market can be integrated with 
the transmission redispatch market, as is the case in Great Britain and 
the Nordics. Similarly, in most U.S. and a few EU markets (e.g., Poland), 
central dispatch is applied, where balancing and wholesale markets are 
cleared jointly (see for example Dallinger et al. (2018) for a discussion 
and ENTSO-E (2018b) for an overview). 
Second, there is an ongoing debate about who should be the market 
operator. The market operators’ main tasks are setting up the market 
platform, clear the market, and settle transactions.5 Burger et al. 
(2019a), Stanley et al. (2019), Ramos et al. (2016) emphasize that to 
ensure transparency and prevent foreclosure, the market operator must 
maintain complete independence from market activities. Gerard et al. 
(2018) and USEF (2018) note that the party being the market operator 
will be a function of whether the flexibility market is separated or in-
tegrated with other markets. Finally, ENTSO-E et al. (2019) stress that 
network operators should act as neutral market facilitators.6 Looking at 
the existing electricity markets in the EU, it can be seen that the market 
operator role depends on the specific market. For example, wholesale 
markets are operated by third-party power exchanges, while balancing 
markets or other ancillary services are currently operated by the TSO. 
Very recently, however, EPEX SPOT and National Grid joined forces to 
develop and operate a platform that will host a brand-new firm fre-
quency response auction trial in Great Britain in 2019 (EPEX SPOT, 
2018). 
Third, there is the option to include a reservation payment. One of 
the possible models of flexibility markets envisioned by Ramos et al. 
(2016) includes long-term contracts used for assuring the availability of 
Table 1 
Overview of the six design controversies and mapping of relevant literature.   
Academic work Stakeholder reports 
1. Is the flexibility market 
integrated into the 
existing sequence of EU 
electricity markets? 
(Gerard et al., 2018;  
Ramos et al., 2016;  
Vicente Pastor et al., 2018; 
Villar et al., 2018) 
(ENTSO-E et al., 2019; 
USEF, 2018) 
2. Is the flexibility market 
operator a third party? 
(Burger et al., 2019a;  
Gerard et al., 2018; Ramos 
et al., 2016; Stanley et al., 
2019) 
(ENTSO-E et al., 2019; 
USEF, 2018) 
3. Is there a reservation 
payment? 
Ramos et al. (2016) (CEER, 2018; EDSO 
et al., 2017; ENTSO-E 
et al., 2019) 
4. Are products 
standardized in the 
flexibility market? 
Villar et al. (2018) (CEER, 2018; EDSO 
et al., 2017; ENTSO-E 
et al., 2019) 
5. Is there TSO-DSO 
cooperation for the 
organisation of the 
flexibility market? 
(Brunekreeft, 2017; Burger 
et al., 2019a; Gerard et al., 
2018; Hadush and Meeus, 
2018; Le Cadre et al., 
2019; Ramos et al., 2016) 
(CEER, 2018; EDSO 
et al., 2018; ENTSO-E 
et al., 2019; USEF, 
2018) 
6. Is there DSO-DSO 
cooperation for the 
organisation of the 
flexibility market? 
(Hadush and Meeus, 2018; 
Stanley et al., 2019) 
/  
3 A regulatory sandbox typically enables experiments with new technologies, 
procedures and business models, by providing for temporary regulatory ex-
emptions. Meeus (2019) describes in more detail the different types of regu-
latory sandboxes. 
4 For a more detailed description of these different existing electricity mar-
kets, please consult Schittekatte et al. (2019). 
5 Ofgem (2019) describes six flexibility platform tasks: coordination, flexi-
bility procurement, dispatch and control, platform transaction settlement, 
platforms market settlement, and analytics and feedback. Flexibility procure-
ment and platform transaction settlement are core tasks of the market operator. 
Defining market products can be a task of the market operator in cooperation 
with the network operators, but might require regulatory approval.  
6 A neutral market facilitator guarantees equal market access for all market 
parties but does not necessarily take up the role of the market operator. 
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flexibility reserves with an activation market near real-time. In that 
respect, CEER (2018) recognises that a lack of liquidity in flexibility 
markets may lead to a situation where long-term contracts may still be 
needed in some cases. ENTSO-E et al. (2019) describe that different 
situations in different Member States might require either more short- or 
more long-term products or a combination of both. Finally, EDSO et al. 
(2018) note that long-term contracts are beneficial for the investment 
security of flexibility providers. Again, the discussion about the need for 
reservation payments is not new. For example, balancing capacity 
markets are used to reserve resources for the balancing energy markets. 
In contrast, market players offering their resources in the wholesale 
market are not subject to a reservation payment.7 
Fourth, there is a discussion about whether products that are traded 
in flexibility markets should be standardized (and how) or whether 
flexibility providers should be allowed more freedom in characterizing 
their offers. Villar et al. (2018) classify flexibility products considering 
its main attributes such as scope, purpose, location, or provider. 
ENTSO-E et al. (2019) recommend that product standardization is 
implemented at least at the Member State level to limit the costs for 
market participants in offering the products. EDSO et al. (2018) list 
several conceivable product attributes. Besides standardizing products 
in a flexibility market, there is also a discussion about whether products 
should be standardized at an EU-level. In that regard, CEER (2018) be-
lieves that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. In existing electricity 
markets, products also vary from market to market. Tailor-made trades 
can be done in bilateral (over-the-counter) markets. Products in 
wholesale markets may have less strict design parameters than products 
in balancing markets. 
Fifth, TSO-DSO cooperation is very much debated when discussing 
flexibility markets. Most of the academic research (such as Brunekreeft 
(2017), Burger et al. (2019a), Gerard et al. (2018), and Ramos et al. 
(2016)), and most stakeholder reports (such as CEER (2018), EDSO et al. 
(2018), ENTSO-E et al. (2019), and USEF (2018)) discuss whether the 
DSO and TSO should procure flexibility in the same market. If the DSO 
and TSO organize the flexibility market together, more questions arise 
regarding whether the DSO or the TSO should have priority over flexible 
resources connected to the distribution grid. Also, how real-time 
TSO-DSO coordination should be done when a flexible resource is acti-
vated in one of the networks is not yet determined. In that respect, 
Hadush and Meeus (2018) describe how TSO-DSO coordination could 
take inspiration from the experiences with TSO-TSO coordination for the 
organization of wholesale and balancing markets. Finally, Le Cadre et al. 
(2019) conduct a game-theoretical analysis of TSO-DSO coordination. 
They observe that in terms of resource allocation, the centralized 
co-optimization of transmission and distribution network resources are 
the most efficient, followed very closely by a so-called decentralised 
coordination scheme in which the TSO and DSO simultaneously clear 
their local markets estimating the flows resulting from the dispatch of 
the DSO or TSO respectively. A third tested coordination scheme in 
which the DSOs act first (anticipating the behaviour of the other DSOs 
and the TSO) results in lower efficiency. In most current electricity 
markets, resources from both the distribution and transmission levels 
can participate through the wholesale markets, balancing markets, and 
even through capacity mechanisms. However, in principle, all these 
markets could be separately organized at transmission- and 
distribution-level. For example, Burger et al. (2019a) and Gerard et al. 
(2018) discuss the option to have DSOs doing local balancing. 
Sixth, the last identified controversy is DSO-DSO cooperation.8 
Hadush and Meeus (2018) provide one of the few studies explicitly 
mentioning DSO-DSO cooperation. They state that the trend toward 
local energy systems might make DSO-DSO cooperation as important as 
the DSO-TSO cooperation, especially when DSOs start to use and orga-
nize flexibility markets for local congestion management. Stanley et al. 
(2019) note that increasingly, the aggregators of distributed flexibility 
and DER act across whole states, provinces and, in the future, across 
borders. Therefore, flexibility providers would benefit from streamlined 
interfaces with different DSOs. In existing markets, the focus was so far 
on TSO-TSO cooperation. TSO-TSO cooperation can vary to a great de-
gree depending on the market. Strong TSO-TSO cooperation is in place 
for the day-ahead wholesale market (market coupling), while TSO-TSO 
cooperation is less developed in balancing markets. 
3. Analysing four pioneering projects 
This section contains two parts. First, the four pioneering projects are 
introduced, including a table with an overview of some key character-
istics. Second, we review the identified design controversy question. For 
each, we explain how each project answers the question, followed by a 
discussion. The approach of each project was derived from structured 
interviews with the respective project representatives. The arguments 
are drawn from an online discussion among experts from the Florence 
School of Regulation (FSR) EU Electricity Network Codes course alumni 
community, an online panel debate on the April 24, 2019 among project 
representatives and the cited literature.9 
3.1. Introducing the four pioneering projects 
First, Piclo (previously known as Open Utility) is an independent 
software company that has been active in the energy industry since 
2013. In October 2016, Piclo launched its first energy application, Piclo 
Match, a peer-to-peer energy matching service (Johnston, 2017). We 
focus on Piclo’s second application, Piclo Flex, which was piloted in 
June 2018 with funding from the U.K. Government Department of 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and subsequently 
launched as a commercial offering from March 2019. All six DSOs in 
Great Britain participated in the BEIS trials. Subsequently, Piclo has 
signed commercial agreements with three DSOs to support their ongoing 
flexibility procurement activities: UK Power Networks (UKPN), Scottish 
and Southern Electricity Networks, and Western Power Distribution. We 
mainly focus on how UKPN uses Piclo to procure flexibility as UKPN 
were the first DSO to use the full functionality of the Piclo Flex service 
during the BEIS trials (Stanley et al., 2019). In March 2019, the first 
flexibility tenders to deliver flexibility needs for 2019/20 and 2020/21 
were organised by UKPN on Piclo Flex. The tenders are organised per 
constraint area, so all flexible resources connected within a predefined 
geographical area can compete in the tender. For one constraint area, 
multiple tenders can be held for different services (such as reinforcement 
deferral, maintenance) and different contract periods. Table 2 gives 
more information about these first tenders. 
Second, Enera is a joint project between the power exchange EPEX 
SPOT, the energy group EWE AG, one of the German TSOs TenneT DE 
and the German DSOs Avacon Netz and EWE NETZ. A scalable pilot is 
built up in a showcase region, in this case in the windy Northwest of 
Germany. The main goal is to enable flexible solutions to avoid uneco-
nomic curtailment of excess wind energy. In Enera, network operators 
7 Excluding capacity mechanisms which can be seen as a reservation mech-
anism to ensure adequacy. 
8 Multiple configurations are possible because DSOs can be connected hori-
zontally but also vertically. 
9 The contributors are identified in the acknowledgements. Currently, two 
editions of the FSR course have taken place for a total of 271 alumni come from 
30 different countries; 50% are senior professionals having five or more years of 
work experience in the sector. About 60% of the alumni work for energy 
companies or utilities, 30% work for public or regulatory bodies, 5% are aca-
demics, and 5% elsewhere. 
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can buy flexibility in the intraday timeframe to proactively alleviate 
congestion.10 As congestion is specific to certain locations in the grid, 
local order books are set up in Enera. The first trade was cleared on the 
February 4, 2019 at 15h25. Audi (with a Power-to-Gas unit) committed 
to increasing its consumption by 2 MW at the request of EWE NETZ for 
delivery on the same day from 17h00–18h00. Table 2 gives more details 
about Enera. 
Third, GOPACS stands for Grid Operators Platform for Congestion 
Solutions and was launched in January 2019. GOPACS is owned and 
operated by the Dutch TSO and four DSOs (Stedin, Liander, Enexis 
Groep, and Westland Infra). GOPACS is different from the other initia-
tives presented here in the sense that it is not a market platform (no 
flexibility offers are cleared on GOPACS). Instead, it acts as an inter-
mediary between the needs of network operators and markets. GOPACS 
is connected to a national intraday platform Energy Trading Platform 
Amsterdam (ETPA), which is operational in the Netherlands.11 GOPACS 
intends to be connected to more market platforms at a later stage. Offers 
from flexibility providers active on ETPA can be procured by GOPACS if 
they add a locational tag. There are no static geographical zones defined 
in ETPA. Instead, GOPACS identifies through its algorithm which assets 
offer the cheapest solution to solve congestion.12 At the time of our 
study, only flexible assets connected to the transmission grid are active 
on GOPACS. In the near future, also DSO connected assets at lower 
voltages are expected to participate. Table 2 gives more details about 
how GOPACS is used. 
Fourth, NODES is a joint venture between the Norwegian utility 
Agder Energi and the European power exchange Nord Pool. NODES was 
established in early 2018. NODES is active in three pilots. One instal-
lation is in place in Norway with the DSO Agder Energi Nett. The other 
two installations are situated in Germany. One is in use by the German 
DSO Mitnetz Strom and the other by the German DSO WEMAG Netz 
(Engelbrecht et al., 2019). Both DSOs are situated in the TSO area of 50 
Hz. The pilots are quite different in aim as the Norwegian DSO mostly 
suffers from growing loads which could require an upgrade of a trans-
former, while the German DSOs need flexibility to avoid curtailment of 
renewables (USEF, 2018). The Norwegian pilot will be expanded in 
2020 and intends to span over three Norwegian bidding zones. On the 
NODES platform, BRPs and network operators can procure local flexi-
bility in the intraday timeframe. The offered flexibility, which is not 
needed locally, will be forwarded to other existing market platforms, 
more specifically the intraday and balancing market. The interfaces 
between NODES and the existing markets are not yet in place. In NODES, 
flexibility providers tag their offers with a grid location (GL). One or 
multiple GLs constitute a local pricing zone. The local pricing zones can 
differ depending on whether the TSO or DSO is buying flexibility and 
can be adjusted dynamically on short notice (cfr. weeks).13 
3.2. Analyzing the projects based on the six design controversies 
3.2.1. Is the flexibility market integrated into the existing sequence of EU 
electricity markets? 
We focus here on the integration of flexibility markets with whole-
sale and/or balancing markets; the integration of DSO flexibility mar-
kets and TSO redispatch markets is discussed in Section 3.2.5. There are 
two projects that provide separate platforms (Piclo Flex and Enera) and 
two projects for which the flexibility market is integrated to a certain 
degree into the existing sequence of markets (GOPACS and NODES). 
Piclo Flex is clearly a separate platform from the existing sequence of 
electricity markets. Tenders are organised on Piclo Flex with a lead-time 
of six months or more, and the contract duration is between a couple of 
months and 4 years (UKPN, 2018a). A pre-qualified flexibility provider 
participating in the tender has to submit both an availability offer (the 
price in £/MW/h for availability) and a utilisation offer (the price in 
£/MWh for utilisation) as well as the maximum running time (Piclo, 
2019a). Contracted flexible resources on Piclo Flex do not have to 
adhere to dispatch instructions by the DSO for the full contracted period 
but only during a service window within the contracted period (e.g., 
winter week-day evenings), which is predetermined at the time of the 
tender. 
Enera is also a separate platform. Enera runs in the intraday time-
frame. Flexibility providers submit offers and network operators submit 
flexibility demand orders that are continuously matched on the plat-
form. Access to the Enera trading platform is standardized, such that 
market parties can use the same API which they use to trade in the 
intraday (energy) market when using EPEX SPOT’s services. Market 
parties have the option to submit offers with the same underlying asset 
for the different markets. The offers can differ in price. However, if all 
offers on the different markets were cleared, the activations would be 
incompatible. The responsibility to avoid double activation lies with the 
flexibility providers. 
GOPACS is integrated into the existing sequence of markets. The 
integration is achieved by sourcing flexibility from existing platforms. 
GOPACS is only connected to ETPA but connections with other markets 
are envisioned. On ETPA, locational flexibility offers for network oper-
ators are not placed on a separate platform but instead are seen as a 
subset of the (wholesale) intraday order book. Network operators and 
market parties (BRPs) can procure the same flexibility. Flexibility pro-
viders have the option to offer the same flexibility at two different prices 
by placing two orders (e.g., one portfolio offer for the intraday wholesale 
and a second offer with locational information). The flexibility provider 
is responsible for avoiding double activations. How GOPACS will con-
nect the other intraday markets and balancing markets remains to be 
seen. 
NODES is integrated into the existing sequence of markets. The 
integration is achieved in two ways. First, NODES is an intraday plat-
form like ETPA and similar to GOPACS, network operators source their 
flexibility offers on the same platform as BRPs. Again, flexibility pro-
viders can construct different offers with the same underlying assets for 
different prices and the flexibility provider is responsible for avoiding 
double activations. Second, the flexibility provided on the NODES 
platform, which is not needed locally, is also envisioned to be forwarded 
to other market platforms, namely, the cross-zonal intraday and 
balancing market (NODES (2018)). 
3.2.1.1. Discussion. One argument in favour of separate platforms and 
three arguments in favour of integrated platforms are identified. 
The main argument for using separate platforms is that the differ-
ences between the products (locational or not) are highlighted, the 
market is easy to clear, and transparency on price levels is created. In the 
debate around central versus self-dispatch, transparency is also used by 
for example Ahlqvist et al. (2018) as an argument in favour of 
self-dispatch electricity systems. 
10 At the time of our study, redispatch in Germany is regulated. Audited cost or 
foregone revenues are paid to the TSO-connected market parties that are acti-
vated for redispatch. As long as this is the case, the only way DSO-connected 
flexibility providers can compete to deliver flexibility to the TSO is by offer-
ing flexibility at a lower price than the costs of the TSO-connected redispatch 
resources.  
11 Besides intraday, ETPA also offers day-ahead, week and weekend contracts.  
12 Finding the cheapest solution to solve congestion is a function of the price of 
the offer from the flexibility provider and of the location of the flexible asset. 
Some flexible assets can have a higher offer price but be more effective due to 
their location relative to the congestion.  
13 For example, congestion at the TSO-level can be solved by flexible assets 
located in different ’’DSO local price zones’’. Thus, the TSO when buying 
flexibility will consider a local price zone which is an aggregate of multiple 
’’DSO local price zones’’. 
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The first argument in favour of integrated markets is liquidity 
pooling. However, products differ on the integrated platform (locational 
or not) and flexibility providers have the option to place separate offers 
for the same underlying assets. This argument would be stronger if 
auctions were used instead of continuous trading (as in Enera, ETPA, 
and NODES). With auctions, the needs of the market parties and network 
operators would be combined at one point in time; as such, the flexibility 
could be allocated more efficiently.14 
The second argument in favour of integrated markets is the 
simplicity of making one platform available to which smaller market 
parties can connect and submit just one offer that can serve for 
congestion management, balancing or for a BRP to balance its portfolio. 
This reduces complexity and access costs to different platforms. 
The third argument in favour of integrated markets is that by 
allowing other market parties (BRPs) to procure locational flexibility in 
the same market as network operators, that market can de facto function 
as a secondary market for flexibility providers. 
3.2.2. Is the flexibility market operator a third party? 
In all four cases, a third party operates the platform. Piclo Flex is 
developed and operated by a new entrant in the energy business. In the 
case of Enera, EPEX SPOT built up the platform, one of the two largest 
power exchanges in Europe. Similarly, for NODES, Nord Pool, the other 
large European power exchange is backing up the development. Besides 
Nord Pool, the other party owning NODES is Agder Energi. Agder Energi 
holds both distribution network assets and generation assets. The 
NODES (2018) white paper states that if NODES is in full operation, it 
will need to be an independent party. As such, Agder Energi will not be a 
major owner of the marketplace. In the case of GOPACS, the platform 
provider (ETPA) is a new independent power exchange. GOPACS is an 
intermediary between the network operators and the market platform. 
3.2.2.1. Discussion. It is important to emphasize that the answer to this 
question is not black and white. Several market operation tasks (such as 
clearing and settlement) could be allocated to third parties while other 
tasks could be the responsibility of the DSO (e.g. validating offers and 
product design). More generally, we identify three arguments in favour 
of having a third party as the market operator and one argument against. 
First, in the case of DSOs, the know-how might not always be present 
in-house to build up market platforms from scratch. Stanley et al. (2019) 
point out that engagement with a specialised third party can allow for 
faster development of the procurement mechanisms of new services. 
Second, an argument often brought up by power exchanges is that by 
letting the market operation function over to a third party, neutrality 
between buyers and sellers is ensured. For example, in the case both 
DSOs and the TSO use the same platform to procure flexibility, or the 
flexibility market is integrated into a local wholesale market, the 
neutrality among buyers is assured by having a third party as market 
operator. Burger et al. (2019a) emphasize that neutrality is even more 
important if the network operator would own distributed energy re-
sources, such as batteries. 
Third, if network operators (DSO or TSO) operate the market plat-
form for flexibility procurement, the platform will be monopolistic by 
nature. However, if a third party operates the platform, this is not 
necessarily the case. The question of whether market operation is a 
monopolistic activity or whether it can be a competitive activity is dis-
cussed in depth by Meeus (2011) for wholesale markets. In that paper, 
we argue that due to network effects, it is hard to have well-functioning 
competition between market platforms but that allowing competition 
may still have benefits, such as stronger incentives for innovation. 
An argument against having a third party as a market operator is the 
cost of interface management between the grid operator and the market 
operator.15 In general, there is always a cost to manage interfaces be-
tween different parties when formerly integrated activities are unbun-
dled. A typical example of the trade-off between removing conflicts of 
interest and the costs of interface management beyond flexibility market 
design is the debate about the unbundling of TSOs or DSOs in network 
asset owners (TNO or DNO) and a system operator (ISO or IDSO) as 
documented by Pollitt (2012) for TSOs and more recently debated in 
Table 2 
Comparison of the four projects at the time of this studya.   
Piclo Flex Enera GOPACS NODES 
Data 1st tender (cleared-15/05/2019), 
flexibility procured by UKPNb 
Status on 09/2019 based on 
interview 
Status on 09/2019 based on 
interview 
Status N pilot on 09/ 2019 based on 
interview - to be extended in 2020c 
Timeframe Months ahead Intraday Intraday Pilot: Intraday 
Extended: Intraday & near real-time 
(only for TSO) 
Market clearingd Auction Continuous trading Continuous trading Continuous trading 
Price zones 28 constraint areas (contracts 
awarded in 7 areas) 
23 local order books, expanded 
from 11 in September 2019 
No static zones, dynamic 
dependent on congestion 
needs 
Pilot: 1 zone 
Extended: order of 7–13 zones 
(dynamic) 
Voltage level flexible units 
(at present) 
11 kV or lower 20 kV or lower 110 kV or higher, soon also 50 
kV or lower 
Pilot: 22 kV or lower 
Extended: 132 kV or lower 
Number of flexibility 
providers 
6 successful (19 prequalified, 15 
bid) 
6 5–10 Pilot: 1 
Extended: 5 
Indication of the magnitude 
of the available flexibility 
18.1 MW contracted flexibility on 
94.8 MW demand 
First trade: 2 MWh, 50 þ
transactions between feb–oct/ 
‘19 
10-100 MWh per trade Extended: projection of �10 MW 
available flexibility  
a Disclaimer: this is a snapshot of the status of the projects, the projects are constantly evolving. 
b Main sources used are UKPN (2019, 2018b, 2018a). At the time of writing, more than 200 flexibility providers offering over 4.5 GW of flexibility are registered to 
Piclo Flex; more than 100 auctions are organized for 73 constraint areas (Piclo, 2019c). 
c More information about the two German pilots (assets connected to 110 kV) can be found in Engelbrecht et al. (2019). 
d Enera, GOPACS, and NODES are also considering including the possibility to reserve assets (month-ahead or longer). In that case, auctions would be used. 
14 However, in the case of low liquidity, there are also arguments in favour of 
continuous trade. 
15 This argument only applies to platforms operated and used by one network 
operator. In case a platform is operated by one network operator but used by 
multiple network operators, there will also be a cost of interface management. 
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Burger et al. (2019b) for DSOs.16 
3.2.3. Is there a reservation payment? 
Looking at the four projects, for now reservation payments are only 
used in Piclo Flex. An important feature of the flexibility tenders 
organised on Piclo Flex is that revenue stacking (contracting with mul-
tiple other services) is allowed.17 Enera, GOPACS, and especially NODES 
all mention that in the future they intend to set up or integrate longer- 
term reservation markets. 
3.2.3.1. Discussion. Two arguments in favour and two arguments 
against reservation payments are identified. 
First, long-term contracts are a way to manage the risk between the 
grid operator and the market parties, guaranteeing that there will be 
flexibility at all times. An issue with services for very specific locations is 
that there are not necessarily many parties present that can offer the 
service in need. One of the possible remedies for such an issue is long- 
term contracts with a sufficiently long lead-time and contract dura-
tion. As such, flexibility providers are given enough time to make the 
necessary investments and enough certainty about future revenue 
streams. This is also what UKPN (2018a) mentions in its Flexibility 
Roadmap. For reinforcement deferral (due to an increase of load), the 
lead-time between the tender and the start of the contract is 6 months or 
18 months. Reinforcement deferral is the main use case of UKPN at this 
moment.18 In the future, the lead times might be reduced significantly, 
for example, to one week. For Enera, the use case is the avoidance of 
curtailment, which can explain why no reservation is in place yet. 
Second, long-term contracting is a way to mitigate gaming. Long- 
term contracting reduces or eliminates the incentive to game prices in 
short-term markets as the impact of short-term price fluctuations on a 
flexibility provider’s revenues are reduced. An elaboration of this 
argument in the context of electricity wholesale markets can be found in 
L�eautier (2018). Two situations in which gaming is possible can be 
distinguished: gaming within a market and gaming between markets. In 
the first situation, players can make use of market power to elevate 
prices above competitive levels, for example when there are very few 
market players that are able to offer flexibility at a specific location at a 
certain point in time. In the second situation, market players have the 
possibility to strategically adapt their bids on wholesale markets when 
they can anticipate congestions that will be solved in a subsequent 
market. This can happens when there is a wholesale electricity market 
with large geographical coverage and subsequently redispatch markets 
at a more local level. As such, market players can consciously aggravate 
(expected) congestions and then be paid in the redispatch market to 
solve the problem they created themselves. This is possible under the 
condition that market players have a good idea of the bottlenecks in the 
grid. This strategy was coined as the incremental-decremental (inc-dec) 
game by Stoft (1999). Holmberg and Lazarczyk (2015) and Hirth and 
Schlecht (2019) show that inc-dec gaming is an arbitrage strategy that 
can even be successful in the absence of market power. Besides 
long-term contracting, there are other possible remedies to limit gaming 
in flexibility markets. As also discussed in Neuhoff et al. (2018), exam-
ples are extensive (automatic) market monitoring and enforcement of 
anti-trust law, price caps and introducing temporary administrative 
prices in locations where there are few players or where structural 
congestion is present.19 
The first argument against reservation payments is that short-term 
efficiency is sacrificed to a certain extent. However, this is only true if 
the utilisation payments are determined at the time of the (reservation) 
tender. The moment that there are enough market parties competing to 
offer flexibility near real-time, the requirement to determine the uti-
lisation payment at the time of the (reservation) tender could be dis-
carded. This is similar to the practice in balancing markets in the EU and 
advocated by for example Müsgens et al. (2014).20 Namely, balancing 
capacity is procured solely based on the balancing capacity offers sub-
mitted by the Balancing Service Providers (BSPs). In real-time, there is 
competition for activation between contracted, who have the obligation 
to bid in the balancing energy market, and non-contracted balancing 
resources (EC (2017), Art 16 (5–6)). 
The second argument against reservation payments, especially with 
long contract durations, is that it can be harder for certain resources 
(such as demand response) due to forecasting difficulties to guarantee 
availability for a long time horizon. Thus, reservation can act as an entry 
barrier for these flexible resources. 
3.2.4. Are products standardized in the flexibility market? 
For three of the projects (Piclo Flex, Enera, and GOPACS) it can be 
said that products are standardized. However, the designs of the stan-
dardized products differ substantially between the projects. Products in 
NODES are not standardized. 
In Piclo Flex, standardized products are in place. The short-term 
activation product is determined per constraint area at the time of the 
tender. At the time of writing, UKPN has 73 constraint areas defined in 
Piclo Flex. Besides location and voltage level, the key operational pa-
rameters are the service window (and the contract duration during 
which this service window holds) and the minimum and maximum 
running time (see also the upper left image in Fig. 1). All other technical 
parameters are validated during the prequalification process. 
In Enera, standard product definitions are determined by EPEX SPOT 
in cooperation with the network operators procuring the flexibility. The 
products look similar as in the intraday with blocks of energy up or down 
for a certain duration (such as 1 h or 15 min) for a certain location as 
shown in the lower-left image in Fig. 1. In terms of locational tagging, 
each order belongs to a certain node predefined by Enera. The local 
order books consist of orders from one or more nodes. 
GOPACS, as currently in place, procures standardized products from 
ETPA to which a locational tag is added. The locational tag is called an 
EAN-code. Unique to GOPACS is that it always procures a combination 
of two orders (a buy and a sell order). This product is called an Intraday 
Congestion Spread (IDCONS) (GOPACS, 2019). The buy and sell orders 
16 Please note that with a third party market operator and a DSO, there is an 
interface between the market on one side and the grid assets and operation on 
the other side. With an IDSO as the market operator and a DNO, an interface 
would be created between the market and operation on one side and the grid 
assets on the other side.  
17 One exception applies, flexibility contracted on Piclo by the DSO to defer 
reinforcement cannot offer additional services that require an increase in active 
load, unless outside of contracted service windows.  
18 Other use cases are maintenance and dealing with unplanned interruptions 
(pre- and post-fault). Depending on the use case, the exact tender design can 
differ. 
19 Another way to avoid gaming is to completely regulate redispatch and 
remunerate instructed redispatch actions based on the audited costs or forgone 
revenue of the called-up resource. However, it is believed that market-based 
redispatch can bring gains by driving redispatch costs down due to competi-
tion and can provide better price signals for where to locate future flexibility 
generation or demand. Another issue with a regulated approach for redispatch 
is that it is very hard to estimate the costs to redispatch the new generation of 
flexible resources such as demand response and storage. As such, these re-
sources would be hard to deploy for such purpose, even though they could be of 
great value for the system. Overall, there is a trade-off between benefits from 
possible competition and costs from possible gaming.  
20 The German balancing market is an interesting case in that regard. Namely, 
in July 2019, the ’’mixed pricing rule’’, which bases the selection of providers 
of balancing reserve on a mix of their capacity and energy bid, has been 
annulled by a court ruling (Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, 2019). The 
mixed pricing rule was in place in Germany since October 2018. At present, the 
balancing reservation is only based on the capacity bid and competition for 
balancing energy activation near real-time is possible. 
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have the same format as intraday wholesale orders (simple bids of 15 
min or 1 h), and orders match in starting time, volume and duration but 
are located in a different area. The upper right image in Fig. 1 illustrates 
the IDCONS product. If congestion occurs in one part of the network due 
to high load, one energy sell order will be procured by GOPACS in that 
part of the grid. At the same time, in a non-congested area, an energy 
buy order will be activated. As such, an energy imbalance is avoided. 
The price of the energy sell order will be higher than the price of the 
energy buy order. The network operator who requests the flexibility 
pays the price difference (or spread) between the orders. 
In NODES, no standard product definitions are set. Instead, flexibility 
providers have the choice to specify their offers using a wide range of 
parameters. Examples are technical and financial parameters, but also 
the generation source can be specified. The lower right image in Fig. 1 
shows the different groups of parameters. As such, a catalogue of flexi-
bility offers is built up. Flexibility buyers can filter offers from the 
catalogue and then select the cheapest offer that fulfils their needs. 
NODES also allows network operators to create a template with the 
parameters they would like to see specified. In terms of location, flexi-
bility offers can indicate in which grid locations (GL) they are connected. 
DSOs and TSOs determine the delineation of GLs, which are smaller for 
DSOs than TSOs and always smaller than bidding zone areas. 
3.2.4.1. Discussion. We identified one argument in favour of and two 
against standardized products. 
The main argument in favour of standardized products is to allow for 
a sufficient level of liquidity, whereby standardized products allow for 
building up a merit order to organize the competition. As a result, with 
standardized products price transparency is promoted. It is more 
difficult to compare the value of offers in case of unstandardized prod-
ucts. The number of different flexibility offers that can be made in-
creases exponentially as a function of the possible product parameters. 
Similarly, in the debate around the European platforms for balancing 
energy liquidity is also the argument brought forward to have (a limited 
number of) standard products (ENTSO-E, 2016). 
The first argument against standardized products is that with stan-
dardized products it is hard to meet very specific flexibility needs of 
network operators.21 
A second argument against standardized products is that a catalogue 
approach has the advantage for flexibility providers that specific char-
acteristics of their flexibility (e.g. reaction time or emissions) can be 
better valued. Flexibility providers can customize their offers and ask for 
premiums when an asset has valuable attributes that would otherwise 
not be valued if they were not part of the product definition. 
3.2.5. Is there TSO-DSO cooperation for the organisation of the flexibility 
market? 
The projects differ in how TSO-DSO cooperation is dealt with. 
GOPACS is built-up and used by one TSO and four DSOs. Enera and 
NODES allow for TSOs to procure flexibility on the same platform as 
DSOs. In the case of NODES, the TSO is not active yet. Piclo Flex is solely 
used by DSOs. 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the different short-term market products in Piclo Flex (service window) –upper left, Enera (locational orders) –lower left, GOPACS (IDCONS 
product) – upper right, and NODES (different types of parameters) –lower right. Sources: Piclo (2019b), USEF (2018), Hirth and Glismann (2018) and NODES (2018). 
21 To draw the parallel with balancing, for this reason, European TSOs are 
allowed to introduce specific balancing products if they can show to their 
regulator that their balancing needs cannot be satisfied only through the Eu-
ropean platforms with standard products (EB GL, Art. 26). 
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GOPACS is very relevant in this regard. GOPACS is one of the first 
implemented TSO-DSO coordination platforms. In its current version, 
GOPACS assures that no conflicting activations occur. In the future, the 
idea is also to identify synergies between the needs of different network 
operators. 
For Enera, one DSO is procuring flexibility and the TSO became an 
active buyer since recently. In the first step of the Enera project, so- 
called Enera 1.0, the DSOs and the TSO are expected to communicate 
bilaterally when activating an offer to avoid conflicts. In the future, the 
idea is to have a ‘vertical coupling’ in place so that offers will be filtered 
on the market platform in a way that no conflicting activation can occur, 
similar to how cross-zonal offers or bids are not accessible if cross-zonal 
links are congested in (horizontal) market coupling. 
No TSO is currently active in a NODES installation. Soon the TSO will 
be active in the extended Norwegian pilot. In the future, TSO-DSO 
cooperation is intended to be dealt with by filtering out the offers 
available to one network operator if they would cause problems for 
other network operators. How grid locations (GLs) are defined, which 
are nothing more than clusters of physical points, can also help to make 
actions of one network operator more transparent for other network 
operators in order to avoid conflicting activations. 
At present, Piclo Flex is solely used by DSOs and the cooperation with 
the TSO is limited at the moment. When a DSO activates a resource for 
congestion management, the DSO has to notify the TSO. 
3.2.5.1. Discussion. We identify three arguments in favour of TSOs and 
DSOs using the same platform to procure flexibility and one argument 
against. 
First, using the same platform limits the number of platforms that 
must be built and take into account by a flexibility provider when 
marketing its flexibility. 
Second, liquidity increases in case TSOs and DSOs procure flexibility 
on the same platform; one asset connected at the distribution level can 
be procured by either the TSO or the DSO to solve congestions. 
Third, by using the same or a similar platform, real-time coordina-
tion between the TSO and DSOs could be facilitated. For now, real-time 
TSO-DSO coordination is focused on avoiding conflicting activations by 
the different network operators. In the future, finding synergetic acti-
vations is expected to be developed, with the activation of one flexibility 
resource able to solve issues in both networks. 
An argument against introducing a platform where both DSOs and 
TSOs procure flexibility is speed. It costs time to set up the collaboration 
with a TSO and by starting with a platform only for one or more DSOs, 
initial experience can be gained. 
3.2.6. Is there DSO-DSO cooperation for the organisation of the flexibility 
market? 
All platforms are intending to engage with more DSOs in the future in 
order to position their (customisable) flexibility market platform as the 
standard solution in Europe. In the case of Piclo Flex, all six DSOs in 
Great Britain participated in the BEIS trials. Subsequently, Piclo has 
signed commercial agreements with three DSOs to support their ongoing 
flexibility procurement activities. Two DSO are currently active on 
Enera (EWE NETZ and Avacon Netz). The case of Enera is different from 
Piclo Flex in the sense that DSOs are vertically connected; EWE NETZ is 
connected to Avacon Netz, which in turn is connected to the TSO TenneT 
DE. In the case of GOPACS, four DSOs besides the TSO are using the 
same TSO-DSO coordination platform. At present, in each NODES 
installation, only one DSO is active. More DSOs are expected to join the 
platforms soon. 
3.2.6.1. Discussion. Three arguments in favour of DSOs using the same 
platform to procure flexibility are identified and one argument against. 
The first argument in favour is that when DSOs cooperate and use the 
same platform, the learning costs for flexibility providers with assets in 
different DSO areas to use the platform can be limited. This is also 
described by Stanley et al. (2019) who discuss the Piclo Flex platform in 
more depth. 
Second, when DSOs use the same platform, the difficulty for the TSO 
to create a different TSO-DSO interface with all DSOs and other relevant 
companies could be reduced.22 
Third, from an operational point of view, activations near the 
boundaries of two DSOs could affect each other networks if they are 
horizontally (or exceptionally, vertically) connected, similarly as is the 
case between two TSOs at the transmission level. For example, it could 
be that there is a congestion issue in the area of one DSO, but that 
cheaper flexibility that could solve that problem is available in the area 
of another DSO. In such a setting, coordination and cost-sharing 
agreements between DSOs need to be developed which are easier to 
develop if the same or similar flexibility platforms are used. 
An argument against DSOs using the same platform to procure 
flexibility is that standardizing the DSOs platforms to some extent (such 
as winner-takes-it-all) could limit benefits from innovation and 
competition between platform providers. 
4. Market access, settlement, and responsibilities 
In order to make flexibility markets work, several choices need to be 
made regarding market access, settlement, and responsibilities. These 
choices go beyond flexibility market design; they have to do with the 
participation of distributed energy resources, individually or through 
aggregation, in electricity markets generally. Studying these choices in 
depth is out of the scope of our study but we highlight five aspects in 
Table 3 and illustrate what choices have been made in the different 
projects. 
First, participation in all flexibility markets is voluntary and no 
technology is excluded. However, in NODES there is the possibility for 
buyers of flexibility to filter flexibility offers depending on the tech-
nology type. 
Second, all projects have a pre-qualification procedure. In almost all 
cases, the pre-qualification is done by the so-called connection network 
operator, meaning the DSO or TSO to which the flexible asset is con-
nected. The pre-qualification procedure is in most cases similar to the 
procedure in place to obtain access to balancing markets. 
Third, there is no harmonized approach in calculating the baseline.23 
UKPN (2018b) describes the use of a baseline methodology based on 
representative historical data when activating flexibility. GOPACS 
makes use of the transport prognoses (t-prognose), whereby flexibility 
providers have to communicate day-ahead schedules that serve as 
baselines.24 The applied baseline method in Enera and NODES depends 
on the connecting network operator and technology. For example, there 
can be a different baseline method for renewable generation than for 
demand response. Setting an adequate baseline is challenging, as dis-
cussed by Rossetto (2018). 
Fourth, at present, none of the projects specify a penalty for non- 
delivery. UKPN (2018c) does describe that in the case of three or 
more default events, the contracting DSO has the right to remove the 
flexible asset from the contract. The general idea behind not having 
penalties is to lower the entry barriers for new entrants. Once experience 
with the flexibility markets has been gained, penalties for non-delivery 
22 An example of another company is a Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) 
company which can take over some tasks of the TSO related to the imbalance 
settlement (e.g. as is the case in GB with Elexon).  
23 The baseline represents the counterfactual generation or consumption level 
of the flexible asset had it not been providing flexibility services. The baseline is 
needed to measure the effective performance of flexible resources and to 
properly compensate the flexibility provider.  
24 In the future, with assets also connected to lower voltage levels, a similar 
procedure might be developed. 
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are considered. 
Fifth, flexibility providers can either act as a BRP themselves or can 
trade on behalf of (or with agreement from) their BRP (USEF, 2018). 
Contractual arrangements between (independent) aggregators, sup-
pliers, and BRPs are a topic of debate and dependent also on the national 
regulatory framework. A recent discussion can be found in Poplavskaya 
and De Vries (2018). In all flexibility markets except for GOPACS, the 
flexibility providers have to self-rebalance after activation of a flexible 
unit. Thus, the cost of self-rebalancing will be reflected in the flexibility 
offer. In NODES, the flexibility providers can choose whether to 
re-balance themselves or to pass it on to the NODES platform to do so. In 
the case of GOPACS, the TSO is directly informed, and the position is 
adjusted in case of an activation. 
5. Conclusions 
The TSO-DSO report from the European TSO and DSO associations 
(ENTSO-E et al. (2019)) introduces three models for flexibility markets: 
DSOs could source flexibility via balancing markets, TSO and DSOs 
could jointly source flexibility for congestion management as a separate 
grid service, or they could do so independently from each other. We 
show that flexibility markets can operate as intraday markets, rather 
than grid service markets. We also show that the integration of flexibility 
markets into existing markets and TSO-DSO cooperation are only two of 
six equally important market design choices for flexibility markets. In 
other words, our case study analysis of four pioneering projects enriches 
the taxonomy and demonstrates that practice is moving faster than the 
conceptual debate around flexibility markets. Table 4 summarizes the 
answers of the four projects to our six-question framework. We observe 
two trends and four key differences among the projects. 
The first trend is that all the considered platforms are operated by a 
third party. This is relatively new in the sphere of ancillary service 
procurement (e.g., balancing and redispatch) in the EU where these 
markets are currently operated by the TSOs. Having a third party 
operating the market platform allows for neutrality between buyers and 
sellers of flexibility. Third parties, such as EPEX or Nord Pool, can be 
more experienced in setting up market platforms than DSOs. Two points 
are important to be added regarding this trend. First, the degree of 
integration of the flexibility market with other (existing) electricity 
markets has an impact on who can be the market operator. Both design 
controversies are hard to decouple. Second, it is important to emphasize 
that the market operator role consists of multiple tasks of which several 
market operation tasks (such as clearing and settlement) could be more 
easily allocated to third parties while other tasks (such validating offers 
and product design) could be the responsibility of the DSO. 
A second trend is that all projects engage or tend to engage with 
multiple DSOs. By doing so, the different platforms providers try to 
become the first-choice flexibility platform provider and establish 
themselves as the lead player that can replicate its solution across the EU 
and further. Having one platform covering multiple DSOs makes it easier 
for flexibility providers who can have flexible assets connected to 
different DSOs. Having one platform for several DSOs can also facilitate 
a more standardized way for the TSO and DSOs to coordinate. 
Depending on the configuration of the networks, DSOs also have to 
coordinate in terms of operations (the two DSOs active in Enera are 
vertically coupled). The pilot projects covered here are deployed in 
countries with several medium-sized DSOs in place. In countries such as 
France, Italy, and Portugal with one dominant DSO, there is less possi-
bility for DSO-DSO coordination in the organisation of flexibility 
markets. 
There are also four key differences among the projects. The responses 
of the projects for these four controversies vary because of different 
visions, use cases, or the maturity of the projects. 
First, the difference in the way the flexibility markets are integrated 
into the existing sequence of EU electricity markets is a clear choice 
made due to the different visions of the projects. On the one hand, Enera 
and Piclo Flex opt for separate platforms to provide transparent price 
levels. On the other hand, by integrating the flexibility market into 
existing markets, GOPACS and NODES try to foster liquidity pooling and 
give market parties the option to formulate one offer that can be used for 
multiple services. At this point in time, it is too early to say whether one 
approach is favourable over the other. It remains to be seen whether and 
how NODES and GOPACS will be able to be integrated or linked to other 
Table 3 
Overview of a selection of design choices beyond flexibility markets.   
Piclo Flex Enera GOPACS NODES 
Data 1st auction (cleared- 15/05/2019), 
flexibility procured by UKPN 
Status on 09/2019 based 
on interview 
Status on 09/ 2019 based on 
interview 
Status pilot on 09/2019 based on 
interview 
Participation Voluntary, no restrictions Voluntary, no restrictions Voluntary, no restrictions Voluntary, no restrictions, but buyers 
can filter offers per technology 
Pre-qualification Yes, done by the connecting DSO Yes, done by the connecting 
SO 
Yes, done by the connecting SO Yes, collaboration between NODES and 
the connecting SO 
Baseline Default baseline is based on representative 
historical data 
Depending on the 
connecting SO and 
technology 
T-prognose (schedule 
communicated D-1 by flex 
provider) 
Depending on the connecting SO and 
technology 
Penalties for non- 
delivery 
No, but DSO can remove a flex unit from the 
contract after 3 ‘‘default events’’ 
No, but considered when 
expanding 
No, not for now No, but considered when expanding 
Balance 
responsibility 
The flexibility provider has to self-rebalance The flexibility provider has 
to self-rebalance 
The flex provider is automatically 
rebalanced 
The flex provider may self-rebalance or 
allow NODES do it  
Table 4 
Project answers to the six design controversies.   
YES NO 
1. Is the flexibility market 
integrated into the 
existing sequence of EU 
electricity markets? 
GOPACS and NODES Piclo Flex and Enera 
2. Is the flexibility market 
operator a third party? 
All projects. GOPACS is not 
a market platform operator 
but an intermediary. The 
market platform is ETPA. 
/ 
3. Is there a reservation 
payment? 
Piclo Flex Enera, GOPACS, and 
NODES (all projects 
envision to integrate 
reservations) 
4. Are products 
standardized in the 
flexibility market? 
Piclo Flex, Enera, and 
GOPACS (IDCONS product) 
NODES 
5. Is there TSO-DSO 
cooperation for the 
organisation of the 
flexibility market? 
GOPACS (TSO and DSOs 
use the same intermediary). 
Enera (DSOs and TSO 
active) and NODES (DSO 
and soon also the TSOs will 
be active). 
Piclo Flex is solely a 
DSO platform 
6. Is there DSO-DSO 
cooperation for the 
organisation of the 
flexibility market? 
Piclo Flex (3 DSOs), 
GOPACS (4 DSOs), Enera (2 
DSOs) and NODES (one 
DSO active per installation, 
soon more will join) 
/  
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markets, as they are planning to do. Barriers exist not only from a 
technical but also from a regulatory point perspective. Discussions about 
these are ongoing. 
Second, only Piclo Flex works with a reservation payment. The main 
identified reasons for the differences among the projects in this respect 
are the use cases. Reinforcement deferral is the main use case of UKPN 
(using Piclo Flex) at this moment. Being sure of delivery is key in this 
respect. For Enera, the use case is the avoidance of curtailment, which is 
less critical and can explain why no reservation is in place yet. When 
projects mature, it is expected that all will implement a form of reser-
vation payments, while Piclo Flex will open its short-term activations for 
more competition. 
Third, the choice for non-standardized products used in NODES is 
deliberate. Allowing for tailored flexibility offers is an innovative 
practice; it makes it possible to value specific characteristics of flexible 
units and makes it possible to meet the specific needs of grid operators. 
However, not standardizing products comes at the expense of liquidity 
and transparent competition between flexibility providers. It is also to be 
seen whether non-standard products are in line with the recently 
adopted Electricity Directive.25 
Fourth, Piclo Flex is the only project where there is no TSO active in 
the flexibility market. Establishing TSO-DSO coordination within a 
flexibility market takes time. Piclo Flex decided to move fast by imple-
menting a DSO-only solution. However, flexible resources contracted by 
Piclo Flex are allowed to engage in revenue stacking (for example by 
also offering services to the TSO). The other three projects allow both 
DSOs and the TSO to procure flexibility, even though the way the 
cooperation between the grid operators is implemented differs. GOPACS 
is an innovator in this respect as it is a true TSO-DSO intermediary that 
allows for dealing with the coordination of grid operators outside of the 
market platform. Through GOPACS, network operators can co-optimise 
their needs. Enera and NODES apply a more traditional approach; 
network operators make more decentralised decisions and the market 
platform deals with the TSO-DSO coordination through the filtering of 
offers or ‘vertical coupling’. TSO-DSO coordination for these projects is 
not yet mature; it remains to be seen which approaches work best in 
practice. Overall, the border between the regulated and commercial 
domain needs further consideration. 
Regarding future work, it will be interesting to revisit this analysis in 
two to three years to see whether or not the answers to the six design 
controversies consolidate. As more market data become available, 
quantitative analysis could also extend this work. 
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